A Systematic Analytic Approach to Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Planning by Barnett, Daniel J et al.
PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1235
T
he prospect of a pandemic with 
avian inﬂ  uenza is an urgent 
concern for public health 
leaders worldwide [1]. As pathogenic 
avian inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) strains 
(Figure 1) continue to spread in East 
Asia, with recently reported expansion 
to Siberia and westward regions in 
Russia [2,3] as well as to migratory 
birds [4,5], the risk for reassortment 
of avian and human strains increases. 
Evidence cited by the World Health 
Organization in May 2005 suggests that 
H5N1 may be adapting to humans, thus 
potentially setting the stage for the next 
inﬂ  uenza pandemic [6].
Animal data suggest that the current 
H5N1 strain appears to be even more 
deadly than the original 1997 Hong 
Kong avian inﬂ  uenza, a ﬁ  nding that 
correlates well with the observed 
human case fatality rates [7]. As of 
August 5, 2005, there have been 112 
human cases of H5N1 in East Asia 
resulting in 57 deaths (case fatality 
rate = 51%) [8,9]. Also concerning 
are recent ﬁ  ndings that in China and 
Indonesia the virus has infected pigs, 
a possible “mixing vessel” for both 
avian and human inﬂ  uenza viruses, 
thus providing an opportunity for 
reassortment from which a pandemic 
human strain could emerge [10,11]. 
Research suggesting that cats could 
host or transmit the H5N1 infection 
[12] adds to a worrisome picture of 
multispecies transmission that can 
elevate the risk of reassortment [9]. 
This epizootic outbreak in Asia is not 
expected to wane in the short term [9].
Inﬂ  uenza pandemics can have 
devastating impacts. The Spanish ﬂ  u 
of 1918 was particularly destructive 
(Figures 2 and 3), resulting in a higher 
death total in less than two years than 
in all of World War I [13]. Although 
earlier accounts suggested the mortality 
from the 1918 pandemic was 20 million 
to 40 million, more recent assessments 
including new estimates from Africa 
and Asia suggest that a more realistic 
ﬁ  gure is 50–100 million [14]. The high 
rates of infection with the pandemic 
virus meant that even an average case 
fatality rate lower than 3% resulted in 
this large number of deaths [13,15]. 
A 1918-type inﬂ  uenza pandemic today 
is projected to cause 180–360 million 
deaths globally (including 1.7 million 
deaths in the United States) [1], with 
transmission of the disease lasting at 
least two years [16].
The Next Pandemic: “Inevitable, 
and Possibly Imminent”
In light of recent episodes of human 
infection with H5N1 virus, the World 
Health Organization reiterated its 1997 
call for all countries to prepare for 
the next pandemic, which it termed 
“inevitable, and possibly imminent” 
[17], and updated its own pandemic 
plan in April 2005 [18]. In the United 
States, it has been argued that of the 
12 disaster scenarios recently assessed 
by the US Department of Homeland 
Security, pandemic inﬂ  uenza is the 
most likely and perhaps the most 
deadly [19]. A draft form of the US 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza plan was made 
public in August 2004 [20], and 
an updated plan is anticipated by 
September 2005.
The urgent need for comprehensive 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza planning is 
profound: an inﬂ  uenza pandemic 
starting today may have major 
international consequences, including 
global economic and political 
destabilization, an overwhelming of 
health care resources, and panic [21]. 
Current international plans [18,22], 
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Figure 1. Colorized Transmission Electron 
Micrograph of Avian Inﬂ  uenza A H5N1 
Viruses Grown in MDCK Cells 
The viruses are gold, and the MDCK cells are 
green.
(Photo: CDC/C. Goldsmith, J. Katz, and S. Zaki)PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1236
Table 1. The Haddon Matrix and Pandemic Avian Inﬂ  uenza
Phase  Factors 
Human Agent/Vector Physical Environment Sociocultural Environment
Pre-event Surveillance for inﬂ  uenza and 
inﬂ  uenza-like illness syndrome 
Surveillance and monitoring 
of avian and human inﬂ  uenza 
strains for genetic and phenotypic 
changes.
Surveillance for resistance to 
antivirals
Pre-event risk communication to 
at-risk populations
Increased usage of antivirals by 
poultry workers during avian 
inﬂ  uenza outbreaks
Compliance with vaccination 
against epidemic (seasonal) 
inﬂ  uenza among persons in close 
contact with birds and animals
Genetic and phenotype 
variation in virulence, 
transmissibility, host range, 
and antiviral susceptibility 
Avian strain infectivity in 
birds and humans
Strain pathogenicity to its 
avian and human hosts
Hospital infection control 
infrastructure (e.g., isolation rooms) 
and protocols
Personal protective equipment for 
poultry workers and health care 
personnel
Laboratory facilities and human 
sentinel sampling system
Availability of avian strain-speciﬁ  c 
vaccines, for both birds and humans, 
or of a novel heterosubtypic active or 
passive immunization
International stockpile of antiviral 
drugs designated for containment of 
limited local spread
National stockpile of protective 
equipment for health care workers
Communication systems
Veterinary surveillance system
Public health infrastructure
Collaboration between human and 
veterinary health authorities
Culling policy
Infection control practices in health care 
settings
Political and social willingness to 
acknowledge and report disease 
dissemination
Budget (preparedness resource allocation)
Human-avian close contact 
Border control, travel advisories, and 
trade policies
Adherence to laboratory safety procedures
Ethical/legal standards for distribution 
of antivirals and vaccine and for physical 
restraint (isolation, quarantine, banning 
of gatherings)
Event Subpopulations at high risk for 
morbidity and mortality
Trained health care and public 
health personnel 
Health care staff adherence to 
infection control protocols
Coverage of seasonal inﬂ  uenza and 
pneumococcal vaccination 
Compliance with prophylactic and 
therapeutic regimens
Compliance with isolation/
quarantine and patient cohorting
Mental health support for public 
and health professionals
Willingness of health care and 
essential personnel to report to 
duty
Infectivity 
Incubation period
Subclinical infection
Modes of transmission
Lethality
Antiviral resistance 
Rate of genetic drifts
Immunological cross 
reactivity with current or 
past circulating inﬂ  uenza 
strains
Health care infrastructure surge 
capacity
Stockpiled antivirals and antibiotics
Stockpiled personal protective 
equipment
Hospital infection control
infrastructure (e.g., isolation rooms) 
and procedures
Laboratory facilities
Availability and mass production 
capabilities of human pandemic strain-
speciﬁ  c vaccines
Availability of a universal (strain-
independent) inﬂ  uenza immunization 
(either active or passive)
Communication network
systems and data aggregation system
Logistical infrastructure for rapid 
distribution of stockpiled antivirals 
and vaccines
Affordable rapid detection tests
Detailed response plan
Criteria for declaring a state of emergency
Public’s psychological preparedness for 
emergencies
Public trust in government’s crisis 
management performance
Willingness of other countries to share 
antivirals and vaccines 
Effective incident command system
Media accuracy and biases
Political and social willingness to 
acknowledge and report disease 
dissemination
Culturally and scientiﬁ  cally appropriate/
consistent messages to health care staff 
and the public
Counseling support for affected health 
care community
Social mixing patterns and adherence to 
restriction of public gathering
Targeted risk communication to staff and 
patients
Legal and ethical framework for 
implementation of response measures
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while useful, could beneﬁ  t from 
enhanced detail [21] and organization; 
moreover, pandemic inﬂ  uenza plans 
have usually been national in scope 
and, in most countries, are only in a 
draft form and lack legal status [23].
The Haddon Matrix
An analytic approach for trafﬁ  c 
safety injury epidemiology and 
prevention was developed by Dr. 
William Haddon, Jr. in the 1960s 
[24], and has since been termed 
“the Haddon matrix.” This matrix 
provides a multidimensional approach 
to understanding the contributing 
factors to injury before, during, and 
after an event [25]. The current 
version of the matrix is a grid with 
four columns, or axes, that represent 
contributing factors to injury (host, 
agent/vector, physical environment, 
sociocultural environment) and three 
rows that correspond to the time 
phases of a given form of injury (pre-
event, event, and post-event) [26]. By 
compartmentalizing an injury into 
dimensions of time and contributing 
factors, the matrix can break a complex 
problem into more manageable 
segments. For each of the 12 cells, a 
decision analysis or prioritization can 
be used to select policies or actions with 
greatest feasibility or inﬂ  uence [27].
Although the Haddon matrix may 
seem unfamiliar to some infectious 
disease scientists, it incorporates 
familiar analytic elements in a 
systematic way. The four columns 
represent the classical epidemiologic 
triad of host, agent, and environment 
(physical and sociocultural). The 
three rows are equivalent to primary, 
secondary, and tertiary prevention of 
disease outbreaks. Indeed, Haddon 
himself used his analytic matrix to 
describe an outbreak of polio [24], and 
this matrix has been recently applied 
to other public-health emergency 
preparedness challenges such as SARS 
[28].
Applying the Matrix to Pandemic 
Inﬂ  uenza Preparedness
Comprehensive public health 
emergency preparedness and response 
efforts require effective pre-event 
(preventive), event (mitigation), and 
post-event (consequence management) 
strategies. By identifying the factors 
that may modify the outcome in each 
of these phases, one can prescribe the 
appropriate measures necessary to 
tackle each factor.
To this end, we speciﬁ  cally applied 
the Haddon matrix to pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza planning and response 
(Table 1), systematically identifying 
relevant factors in each phase (pre-
event, event, post-event) and on 
each axis (human, agent/vector, 
physical environment, sociocultural 
environment). We then identiﬁ  ed 
factors that may be associated with 
opportunities for public health 
intervention, and marked these factors 
in bold within the matrix (consistent 
with an approach described by Runyan 
[27]).
The table shows that in all phases of 
an inﬂ  uenza pandemic, opportunities 
for public health intervention include 
a number of contributing human, 
physical environment, and sociocultural 
factors, but generally not agent/vector 
factors, since viruses generally cannot 
be modiﬁ  ed easily as injury-causing 
devices. Importantly, the pre-event, 
event, and post-event rows of the 
matrix reﬂ  ect the phase of a pandemic 
in which public health preparedness 
and response measures will take their 
effects; however, planning for each of 
these measures must occur before the 
pandemic begins.
The use of the Haddon matrix in the 
table as an analytic and planning tool 
for pandemic inﬂ  uenza is illustrated 
below by its application to readiness 
efforts in two different countries: 
Thailand, focusing on pre-event factors; 
and Israel, focusing on event factors. 
We chose Thailand as an example 
because of its regional susceptibility 
and the proactive nature of its anti-
H5N1 planning efforts to date. We 
selected Israel as an example of a 
country outside of East Asia that has 
taken steps to address this potential 
global crisis. For both countries, we 
demonstrate the application of the 
matrix by addressing selected factors 
within each axis.
Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Planning 
in Thailand
Thailand has had experience with 
H5N1 infections in both humans 
and animal populations—including 
chickens, ducks, birds, ﬁ  ghting 
roosters, and tigers—since January 
2004. By October 2004, a total of 17 
patients with H5N1 infection were 
identiﬁ  ed, of whom 12 had died. The 
initial success of Thailand’s national 
program against H5N1 avian inﬂ  uenza 
Table 1. Continued
Phase  Factors 
Human Agent/Vector Physical Environment Sociocultural Environment
Post-event  Post-event risk communication
Storage and management of remains
Psychology of post-event reactions
Post-event inﬂ  uenza-like illness 
surveillance for the predictable 
second wave of the pandemic 
during the following year
Monitoring of genetic and 
phenotype changes
Persistence of agent in 
environment
Genetic drifts
Restoration of medication stocks and 
equipment
Cultural competency of post-event 
messages
Residual functionality of health care and 
public health systems
Governmental ﬁ  nancial support of 
affected system
Ongoing mental health support and 
follow up
Economic impact on affected community
Items in bold are potential targets for public health intervention.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020359.t001
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that began in the autumn of 
2004 is evidenced by the fact 
that no human cases have 
been found between October 
2004 and August  2005. 
Thus, Thailand’s experience 
may offer practical lessons 
in preparing for an avian 
inﬂ  uenza-related human 
pandemic.
Through the lens of 
pre-event Haddon matrix 
factors, one can identify 
the strengths in Thailand’s 
preparedness efforts, as well 
as opportunities for further 
enhancements. Selected 
examples of the pre-event 
axes for Thailand’s pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza readiness efforts 
are described below.
Pre-event human factors. 
Thailand has developed 
surveillance and laboratory testing 
algorithms for inﬂ  uenza-like-illness 
in humans and animals, including 
deﬁ  nitions for “suspect,” “probable,” 
“conﬁ  rmed,” “excluded,” and “on 
investigation” cases of H5N1. With 
written guidance from national 
authorities [29], public health workers, 
veterinary health workers, village 
health volunteers, and others [30] 
participated in an ongoing surveillance 
campaign nationwide beginning in 
October 2004 [31].
Pre-event risk communication to 
at-risk populations are also important. 
In the scenario of pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza, effective pre-event risk 
communication can reduce event-phase 
risk communication barriers [32]. 
An array of appropriate information 
on avian inﬂ  uenza and potential 
pandemic human inﬂ  uenza has been 
disseminated by the Thai Ministry of 
Public Health [33].
Pre-event agent/vector factors. 
Strain pathogenicity to its avian and 
human hosts is the major pre-event 
agent/vector factor. Most cases 
of human H5N1 infection have 
resulted from contact with infected 
chickens, ﬁ  ghting roosters, or ducks 
[9], with some ducks possibly being 
asymptomatic [34]. Regarding human 
pathogenicity, an autopsy of a patient 
from Thailand, one of the few involving 
H5N1 infection [35,36] reported 
that the virus can replicate in the 
human intestine as well as the lung 
[37] perhaps helping to explain the 
ﬁ  nding of diarrhea in some patients in 
Thailand and Vietnam [37–41].
Pre-event physical environment 
factors. Thailand has established a 
multifaceted communication system, 
including websites for human and 
animal-related H5N1 updates and 
standard protocols. Provincial health 
ofﬁ  ces were directed by the Ministry 
of Public Health to form Surveillance 
and Rapid Response Teams at the 
provincial and district levels [42].
Hospital infection control 
infrastructure and protocols are also 
crucial. Patients meeting criteria for 
possible H5N1 infection “should be 
isolated and placed in a single room 
according to the standard precautions 
of the Ministry of Public Health” 
[42]. Even if the patient’s initial rapid 
test for inﬂ  uenza A is negative “the 
patient must be treated with antivirals 
immediately” [42] in an effort to 
increase survival [41].
The availability of avian strain-
speciﬁ  c vaccines is another signiﬁ  cant 
factor. Webster and Hulse observed 
that Thailand’s investigation of 
ﬂ  u vaccines for “open range” 
(noncommercial) poultry represents 
a “prudent” policy shift that should be 
replicated in other countries in East 
Asia [43]. H5N1 vaccine studies in 
humans have not yet been initiated in 
Thailand.
Pre-event sociocultural factors. 
One of the most signiﬁ  cant factors 
is political and social willingness 
to acknowledge and report disease 
dissemination. Initially, 
the Thai government was 
criticized for underplaying 
the existence and the 
magnitude of avian inﬂ  uenza 
in Thailand [44] but it 
has since taken signiﬁ  cant 
proactive steps to address this 
urgent challenge. Between 
January 2004 and July 2005, 
a total of 59 ofﬁ  cial reports 
on surveillance for Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Inﬂ  uenza 
have been submitted to the 
World Organization for 
Animal Health by Thailand 
[45], and detailed reports 
were promptly published 
[35,36,38,41,46–48]. On 
September 28, 2004, the 
ﬁ  rst media report of a 
probable case of person-
to-person transmission 
appeared in Thailand [49] and was 
rapidly published [36]. On September 
29 of that year, a national campaign 
against the H5N1 virus was declared 
by the Prime Minister of Thailand, 
with involvement by the Thai Cabinet 
[50,51]. These resulting efforts seem 
to have had a substantial impact, as 
detailed above.
Budget (preparedness resource 
allocation) is also important. The 
Thai National Strategic Plan for Avian 
Inﬂ  uenza and Plan for Pandemic 
Preparedness 2005–2007 was initiated 
with a budget of 4,026 million Thai 
baht (~US$105 million) [52,53]. 
Thailand has been reported recently to 
have approved funding for the future 
purchase of up to 100,000 treatments 
of oseltamivir [54].
An in-place culling policy played a 
signiﬁ  cant role. The culling of ducks 
(with farmer compensation) reduced 
the ﬂ  ocks that were positive for H5N1 
from around 40% infected in October 
2004 to almost undetectable levels in 
March 2005 [43].
Collaboration between human 
and veterinary health authorities 
was vital. Efforts are ongoing to 
closely link public health and 
animal health responses to H5N1 
[52,53]. Surveillance combines 
epidemiologically linked testing for 
animals and humans [55]. In addition, 
Thailand interacts frequently with the 
World Health Organization regarding 
clinical H5N1 issues, and with the 
World Organization for Animal Health 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020359.g002
Figure 2. Emergency Hospital during 1918 Inﬂ  uenza Epidemic, Camp 
Funston, Kansas, United States
(Photo: Image “NCP 1603,” National Museum of Health and Medicine, 
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C.)
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in reporting on animal surveillance for 
H5N1 [56].
Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Planning 
in Israel
Applying the various inﬂ  uencing 
factors listed in the event phase of the 
Haddon matrix to the unique Israeli 
setting leads to several important 
insights regarding local pandemic 
preparedness, as shown in the following 
examples.
Event human factors. Israel has not 
initiated, as of yet, training activities 
for health care professionals directed 
speciﬁ  cally at pandemic preparedness, 
although such activities are planned 
to take place.  Nevertheless, Israeli 
health care professionals, particularly 
frontline health care workers, are well 
experienced with terrorism-related 
mass casualty emergencies. Continuous 
training of the various components of 
the health care system for bioterrorism 
threats likely serves to enhance these 
workers’ ability to deal with naturally 
occurring epidemic threats; these 
health care teams were shown to have 
increased likelihood of reporting to 
duty during a crisis [57]. Simulation-
assisted medical training may be useful 
in increasing health care workers’ 
compliance with personal protective 
equipment and infection control 
protocols, as has been shown in the 
preparation of Israeli medical teams to 
respond to chemical warfare casualties 
[58]. Upcoming tabletop exercises 
will test and reﬁ  ne current 
national contingency plans, 
while full-scale drills may 
be required to test certain 
practical and logistical 
aspects of antiviral drug 
dissemination.
Event agent/vector factors. 
Agent/vector factors listed 
in the matrix are expected 
to determine much of the 
local impact of the pandemic, 
but they generally cannot be 
inﬂ  uenced by preparedness 
and mitigation efforts. As 
these factors will remain 
unknown until the ﬁ  rst stages 
of the pandemic, Israeli 
preparedness planners have 
taken into account a wide 
range of scenarios with 
different attack and mortality 
rates [59] in addressing 
issues such as surge capacity. 
For instance, a highly transmissible 
pandemic may render isolation and 
quarantine efforts largely futile [60] 
while a less transmissible strain, as 
witnessed in previous pandemics [61] 
may enable a containment approach 
more similar to that taken during the 
SARS epidemic (while accounting 
for considerable differences such as 
the incubation time or the impact 
of infectious asymptomatic cases). 
A highly pathogenic strain, perhaps 
more pathogenic than the 1918 strain 
(considering current case fatality rates 
of H5N1 human cases), will require the 
unparalleled ability to rapidly mobilize 
medical equipment and personnel to 
meet the increased demands for care 
in both primary and secondary care 
facilities. However, a less pathogenic 
strain may require measures similar 
to those taken during severe seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza epidemics.
Event physical environment 
factors. The availability of an effective 
immunization will be crucial. The 
importance of the recently published 
successful preliminary results of phase-
I human H5N1 vaccine trials cannot 
be overestimated [62]. Nevertheless, 
both the safety and efﬁ  cacy of the new 
vaccine remain to be assessed, and the 
effectiveness of this vaccine against a 
reassortant pandemic strain is currently 
difﬁ  cult to predict.
Research efforts to produce active 
or passive immunization that will 
be universally effective against any 
inﬂ  uenza strain are currently underway 
in Israel and elsewhere. Once available, 
such modalities hold great promise 
for mitigation of future pandemics 
in their ﬁ  rst stages [63]. Another 
type of immunotherapy that may be 
considered during an event is the use 
of immunoglobulins isolated from 
recovered patients to treat the ill or 
protect the exposed.
Stockpiled antivirals and antibiotics 
are important to Israel’s preparedness. 
The Israeli Ministry of Health has 
successfully used cost-beneﬁ  t analyses 
[59] to persuade decision makers 
to invest the funds necessary for the 
rapid creation of a national antiviral 
stockpile, and several strategies for the 
use of these drugs during the pandemic 
are considered [64]. The antiviral 
oseltamivir was found to be effective in 
mice against the newest strains of avian 
inﬂ  uenza currently sweeping through 
East Asia, suggesting that higher doses 
and prolonged courses of this drug 
may be required [7]. These ﬁ  ndings, 
if validated in humans, may need to 
be factored into stockpiling planning 
efforts.
Event sociocultural factors. Israel 
has ensured that a legal and ethical 
framework for implementation of 
response measures exists. Including 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza in the list of 
“dangerous communicable diseases” 
deﬁ  ned by Israeli law will allow 
the Ministry of Health to uphold 
extreme measures such as involuntary 
quarantine and isolation, if needed.
Prioritizing target groups for antiviral 
drugs and vaccines, expected 
to be in short supply, requires 
the addressing of complex 
ethical, legal, social, and 
political considerations. The 
choice of which groups to 
prioritize would derive, in 
part, from the prioritizing 
of the various goals in using 
these drugs. If the focus is 
on reducing all mortality, 
different groups may be 
prioritized than if the main 
attempt is to reduce social 
disruption. A national ethics 
committee was recently 
appointed to address these 
issues.
Conclusions
By offering phase-speciﬁ  c 
insights into pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza planning, the 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020359.g003
Figure 3. Historic Chart Showing Mortality Rates in America and 
Europe during 1918 and 1919
(Photo: Image “Reeve 3143,” National Museum of Health and Medicine, 
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C.)
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Haddon matrix bridges injury-
prevention epidemiology with global 
infectious disease preparedness and 
response. In the process, this analytic 
tool sheds light on opportunities 
for prevention, mitigation, and 
consequence management strategies to 
address a global public health threat.
In the face of the challenges 
described, the Haddon matrix analysis 
of pandemic inﬂ  uenza planning 
in Thailand and Israel reﬂ  ects its 
applicability as a systematic tool 
for identifying urgent national and 
international pandemic avian inﬂ  uenza 
readiness needs. The scalability of 
the matrix also allows its use at the 
level of a county or city, as well as 
within institutions. At each of these 
levels, the matrix may facilitate 
the enhancement of preparedness 
plans, needs assessments, best 
practice identiﬁ  cation, and resource 
distribution strategies.
Although the national examples 
above have selectively focused on pre-
event factors in Thailand and event 
factors in Israel, the Haddon matrix 
can be also used to augment existing 
post-event phase plans. For example, 
the psychology of post-event reactions 
[65] must be addressed through 
ongoing mental health support and 
follow up and by effective post-event 
risk communication. The public 
health infrastructure may face the 
dual challenge of helping populations, 
including health care providers 
themselves, to be psychologically 
prepared for the next wave of a 
pandemic—perhaps worse than the 
ﬁ  rst wave, as was the case in the 1918 
pandemic [13]—while trying to recover 
from the ﬁ  rst wave.
The Haddon matrix has limitations 
that must be recognized to ensure 
appropriate implementation. 
Importantly, the matrix is not a stand-
alone planning tool; rather, the results 
of any Haddon-matrix–based analysis 
must be operationalized in the form 
of policies and procedures to achieve 
their desired effects on the factors 
included in the matrix. Moreover, 
the matrix is not static; the contents 
within its cells can and should be 
modiﬁ  ed according to changing disease 
dynamics and situational challenges to 
maintain its usefulness in an evolving 
crisis.
Furthermore, even before a 
crisis, the choice of contents for 
each cell is not absolute, and open 
to the subjective interpretation of 
those who are preparing the matrix. 
Consequently, the table presented 
in this article should be regarded as 
a starting planning framework, not 
a ﬁ  nal checklist. Also, while many of 
the items in the Haddon matrix cells 
may be measurable, the matrix itself 
is only a planning instrument—not an 
evaluation tool.
The known potential for an avian 
inﬂ  uenza pandemic offers not only 
challenges but also unprecedented 
opportunities for advance planning 
at all levels of public health in the 
international community [66]. This 
planning window may be rapidly 
closing, however [21]. As an efﬁ  cient 
yet comprehensive analytic approach, 
the Haddon matrix lends itself to the 
types of rapid and complex decision 
making necessary to plan for and 
respond more effectively to an urgent 
pandemic health threat.  
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